On the Dignity of the Person: The Paradox of Sacrifice

Sacrifice of Isaac
Sacrifice of Isaac by Rembrandt @ The State Hermitage Museum

Disclaimer

I recently read a blogpost titled Kierkegaard is wrong in which the author critiques Kierkegaard’s notion of “faith” in Fear and Trembling. In short, he argues that the notion of a God who demands the sacrifice of one’s child by faith is not only absurd, but also immoral. It is a very thoughtful and balanced article. As I’m somewhat of a fan of Kierkegaard, and have pondered the subject, I’m inclined to give as thoughtful a response as I’m capable of, but a disclaimer is necessary. For starters, sacrifice is fundamentally incompatible with my self-centred and spoiled nature, so I’m not in the least qualified to write about it. In addition, the cultural, moral, political and religious manifestations of sacrifice is too broad and profound a subject to be treated in a blogpost. So I will try to keep a narrow focus of my post on a few premises of the author which I disagree with and I think undermine his conclusion. As usual, I welcome any feedback on the subject.

Sacrifice and Justice

The author writes that “one should never kill one’s child (or any child)”. If I may be forgiven for being a little provocative: Parents kill their children all the time.

Parents in all nations and in all ages send their children to die in war for their country. I suppose they believe sacrificing their children and their own lives for a greater good is just and moral. A pacifist may argue against the idea of war, but he cannot argue that sacrificing children is against the norm of humanity.

One of the founders of the ancient Roman Republic, Lucius Junius Brutus, put his two sons to death for conspiring against the Republic.[1] He was held in high regard and praised by many, including Cicero, for his legendary act; In Plutarch’s “Life of Coriolanus”,[2] on which the Shakespearean play is based, Roman general Coriolanus waged war against his own nation to avenge personal wrongs. Rome was on the verge of destruction, and in desperation sent Coriolanus’ mother Volumnia to plead with her son. She persuaded him to abandon the war, knowing that his life would be forfeit if he yielded to her.

Parents killing their children for the sake of justice is regarded as moral not only in ancient Rome, but also in ancient China. In fact, there is a Chinese idiom , “大義滅親”, which literally means, “[with] great justice/righteousness destroy one’s child/relative”. 義, the character representing justice/righteousness, is a logogram derived from characters representing animal sacrifice. Philosopher Mengzi (孟子) wrote, “I desire life, I also desire justice/righteousness. When I cannot have both, I relinquish life for justice/righteousness”.[3]

The Sacrifice of Isaac

I agree with the author that God must be just and moral, in a way that is consistent with our understanding of justice and morality, provided that our moral understanding is right.

A common and understandable objection to the Sacrifice of Isaac is: What has the child done to deserve death? If I may be so bold as to reply: What has the child done to deserve life?

Life is not a right, but a gift. A child does not deserve life any more than an adult does. According to the Biblical narrative, Abraham’s wife Sarah was barren and past the age of childbearing, when God promised Abraham a son, Isaac, as a gift. On a human level, it is only just that one can take away what he has given in the first place, so the sacrifice of Isaac to God is also just.

We would all agree that a God who gives life is good, and the higher the lifeform the better. The Judeo-Christian notion of God is the Creator of the world and all living beings in it, the Creator, Giver and Sustainer of Life. As Jesus told his disciples, “I have come that they may have life, and that they may have it more abundantly”. However, the Christian notion of Life is paradoxical: Life in God, which is much higher than our natural life, is impossible unless through death.

The Sacrifice of Isaac, as I understand it, is Christianity in a nutshell. It is a paradox that life in God is impossible unless through death. There are many Scriptural versus that express this paradox. For example, “For whoever desires to save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for My sake will find it”(Matt. 16:25), and “Most assuredly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it produces much grain”(John 12:24). The Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky quotes John 12:24 as epigraph for his magnum opus, Brothers Karamazov, a great novel dramatizing the existential struggles with death, suffering, faith and love.

Faith is indeed a matter of trust. The ultimate trial of faith that Abraham has undergone confronts each individual: Is he willing to trust the faithful Creator with his life and the life of his loved one?

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5 comments

  1. Prof. C. Fred Alford, the author of the blogpost I was responding to, kindly responded to my post here.

    Dear Prof. Alford,

    Welcome! My purpose is to engage in civil dialogues and learn from those whose views differ from my own. So I especially appreciate your taking the time to respond. This was actually the first time I ever responded to a blogpost with a blogpost.

    I understand that yours is a “should” statement, but part of my point is that people’s moral understanding differ. Those who sacrifice themselves and their children believe they “should” do that. You might disagree, but from their human point of view, their act is moral and just, and therefore a god who commands such an act is also just.

    If Abraham didn’t love his son Isaac, it would have been selfish to sacrifice him, but Abraham loved his son more than himself, and so sacrificing Issac IS self-sacrifice for Abraham.

    I think Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling is a meditation on the following passage in Hebrews, according to which, what is absurd is not the command to sacrifice Isaac, but the resurrection of Isaac which is implied in that command. In other words, it is not so much what God want from his people, but what He will do for His people. This is also a miniature of the Gospel.

    By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac, and he who had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, of whom it was said, “In Isaac your seed shall be called,” concluding that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead, from which he also received him in a figurative sense.
    Hebrews 11:17-19

    Nemo

  2. Well.if I said God had told me to kill my brother/child./ anybody I would be locked up in a psychiatric unit.id I confided in a friend or my doctor.They would be unlikely to believe I was right
    The examples of war,justice,betrayal etc are not the same odas taking your child up a mountain while you carry abig sharp knife.
    In the long ago past,human sacrifice was common,I believe and then it changed to animals and other non-human beings.The idea was if you sacrificed the best thing/person you had it would make God look well on you.Later ideas about God changed.
    I like Kierkegaard… I like anyone who thinks seriously.But the idea of being willing to kill you child should be seen metaphorically,in my view.There is the Via Negative probably not followed nowadays

    1. Well.if I said God had told me to kill my brother/child./ anybody I would be locked up in a psychiatric unit. If I confided in a friend or my doctor.They would be unlikely to believe I was right

      Yes, people (myself included) would be unlikely to believe you, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that God did not give you such a command, or that the command is immoral.

      I think we need to address two basic questions when discussing issues of morality: By which principles do we judge whether a deed is moral or not? How can we apply those principles to the specific act in dispute?

      I think the sacrifice of Isaac is in accord with commonly held principles of justice, and I’ve explained why in my posts.

      But the idea of being willing to kill you child should be seen metaphorically,in my view

      I agree that the Sacrifice of Isaac can be and has been interpreted metaphorically, but it doesn’t follow that a more literal interpretation is invalid. Both interpretations may be valid and significant.

  3. Kierkegaard writes, “In ethical terms, Abraham’s relationship to Isaac is quite simply this: the father shall love the son more than himself.” (Fear and Trembling, trans. by Howard & Edna Hong, Princeton University Press 1983, p. 57)—-and yet, he writes that Abraham is a hero, a knight of faith, because he offered his son to God. He writes that the person who would do what Abraham did and offer his child to God “probably will be executed or sent to the madhouse”(p. 29)—-and yet, Abraham is a knight of faith.

    There are several possible avenues of interpretation here. First, I think it does help to remember some background, some of which was known to Kierkegaard’s contemporaries and some which was not until his journals were published posthumously. His own “Isaac” was his engagement to Regine. He took this very seriously; a betrothal in those days was a much more serious thing than an engagement for our frivolous age. He believed he had an ethical duty to carry through on his promise of marriage, as well as wanting it personally. But he also felt that God had blocked the marriage. He could not explain this directly, possibly because he didn’t understand it himself, but all the analysis and questioning of his motives would still end up at the same point: that Kierkegaard believed he had given up his one true love because God had demanded it, and yet he also believed that somehow, miraculously, his faithfulness to God would be accepted and that he would in time be allowed to marry her after all, just as Isaac had been restored to his father. Simultaneous with Fear and Trembling he wrote Repetition, which deals with a young man who has broken off his engagement without explanation because he felt there was a divine veto and now waits for a miraculous restoration of what he has lost, just as Job received back double all he had lost. Part (only part) of what is going on is Kierkegaard’s wrestling with his own faith and trying to process his own experiences. But he thinks his experience points towards larger truths about faith, guilt, sin and redemption, so he is not merely self-analyzing; he is looking to find truths that will help others.

    Second, please remember that he is writing pseudonymously. When Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym, he is creating a character; to say “Kierkegaard believes….” is much like saying “Shakespeare believes….” when you should be saying , “Hamlet says….” Johannes de silentio does not have faith. He is trying to understand Abraham and faith, but cannot because he does not have faith himself. Some of what he says may be untrue, or partial.

    Third, Kierkegaard and de silentio are responding to Hegel. Hegel’s philosophy was tremendously influential in the Danish church at that time; Kierkegaard’s college instructor on Hegelianism, Prof. Martensen, went on later to become head of the Danish Lutheran Church. Hegel has said that religion is important, but ultimately only partial; it is a picture-thinking pointing towards the insights of his own philosophy. Three times de silentio writes an analysis of Abraham from the Hegelian perspective, which would put the ethical higher than the religious and the universal relationship to the good higher than the individual relationship to God; and three times de silentio concludes “in that case Hegel is right—-but Abraham is lost; and Hegel should have said this.” Right-wing Hegelians like Martensen have sought to have it both ways; they’ve tried to explain Hegel in universal ways and tried to keep him as a hero. Kant at least has the consistency, in_Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone_, to say that Abraham or anyone else who would violate the ethical because of a purported command from God is simply wrong. If Abraham is special, de silentio is saying, it is his faith that is special; his actual deeds are quite unique and incomprehensible. What matters is the nature of his relationship to God; he does not relate to God merely as the lawgiver of the universe, but rather as one person to another, this particular creature to his Creator.

    Kierkegaard’s exegetical approach is always imaginative but not metaphorical. As Nemo indicates, Kierkegaard does not raise doubts about whether the particular events are literally true or false; he is not demythologizing. But he also says that the literalist misses the point of the stories; what matters is not whether Abraham did this, but what the doing of this indicates about Abraham’s faith that we all should learn. If there were no greater lesson and this were merely an historical record, there would be no need to remember it. So I hesitate to follow Katherine and call it “metaphorical;” I think Nemo is right to remember that Kierkegaard did assume it was true while still asking, “What does it mean?”

    If Hegel were right, we could forget Abraham and simply embrace modern theology; the full flower of Christian thought has come, the fruits are ripe for harvest, and the full meaning of stories like the Binding of Isaac and the Suffering of Christ has been expressed in the Danish Lutheran Church and modern Christendom, and in Hegelian philosophy which understands it all. But if Abraham truly is a hero, then faith is something that cannot be fully expressed in words, and certainly can’t be fully encompassed in a philosophy. It is more like love, that ultimately must be expressed indirectly because it is a unique relationship between unique individuals; a love story or a poem or even an historical record of the deeds of lovers does not tell you precisely what love is, though showing you love in action can give you insights and may help you weed out the counterfeits. De silentio’s Abrahamic meditations can’t tell you what faith is, and can’t even tell de silentio what faith is since he has never felt it himself, but they do point out false interpretations. It is not simply being willing to “give God the best;” it is not sacrificing for a higher good, the way Brutus sacrificed his sons out of patriotic duty, and it is not merely a precursor for the philosopher’s dialectical understanding of Absolute Spirit’s logical movement through history as the truths expressed mythologically in the Bible and other religions has unfolded into the explicit truths of philosophy.

    So it is absolutely true that any parent should love the child more than self, more than anything; and it is absolutely true that anyone who would do what Abraham did should be locked up; Kierkegaard says this through de silentio, and yet says that Abraham is the hero, the knight of faith, whose example lights the way of every generation, each individual separately, as each seeks to have faith in God.

    Finally, two points, one pointing backwards and one forwards. In Either/Or the first volume states that the pure sensuality of Don Juan must be expressed in music, because when you introduce words, language, you introduce reflection, which in turn introduces the ethical. To put anything into words is to universalize it, to put it into categories everyone can understand. The purely esthetic, pre-ethical life cannot be put into words because it is idiosyncratic; the person simply does what feels good to him or her and cannot explain further. Kierkegaard says that the religious is the “second immediacy;” that is, the human spirit which has acquired reflection and language and understood “good” in the universally comprehensible categories of morality has now moved into a new sort of life that cannot be fully expressed logically and literally. This is de silentio’s point also, when he discusses whether Abraham was justified in keeping silent.

    And as Ron Green points out in Kierkegaard and Kant: the hidden debt, there is a covert topic here which only briefly appears but which is the most important part of the book: the discussion of sin (pp. 98-99 and particularly the footnote). All of us fall outside the ethical, because all of us fall under the judgment of the ethical and are guilty. Faith seeks to recognize this and restore the individual to a relationship to the good, not this time through righteousness but through a recognition of one’s own guilt and need for grace. There is more about this in _Kierkegaard on Ethics and Relgion (Continuum Press) in the chapter on the writings of 16 October 1834.

    I hope that helps or was at least interesting.

    1. 1. Your first point raises an interesting question about Kierkegaard’s view of marriage. In “Attack upon Christendom” (p. 213), Kierkegaard made the following arguments against marriage. I suspect this is not a mindset that would lead one to “live happily ever after”.

      The task of becoming a Christian being so prodigious, why should I charge myself with this impediment, although people, especially when they are at a certain age, represent it and regard it as the greatest felicity?  … a man who was himself saved, and redeemed at so dear a price that it was accomplished by another man’s agonizing life and death, it was after all the least one could require that he should not engage in begetting children, in producing more lost souls, for of them there are really enough.

      2. You wrote, “When Kierkegaard uses a pseudonym, he is creating a character; to say “Kierkegaard believes….” is much like saying “Shakespeare believes….” when you should be saying , “Hamlet says….” “

      Point taken. In the context of this discussion, however, Kierkegaard is also a character, just as Hamlet and Abraham are characters, in the sense that we’re using his name to represent a certain set of beliefs or behaviour patterns, regardless of whether the character actually existed historically or whether he actually held those beliefs.

      3. “To put anything into words is to universalize it, to put it into categories everyone can understand.

      I think this is why Kierkegaard is fighting a battle he cannot win: he attacks Hegel using Hegelian categories. By writing about faith in philosophical terms, he is doing precisely what he insists should not be done, i.e., universalizing faith. To the extent that faith can be expressed in words, it is possible to defend/justify it on rational and logical ground everyone can understand, which is the basic point of my post.

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