Tyranny vs. Democracy
A united force is more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided. … Therefore, just as it is more useful for a force operating for a good to be more united, in order that it may work good more effectively, so a force operating for evil is more harmful when it is one than when it is divided. … for the same reason that, in a just government, the government is better in proportion as the ruling power is one-thus monarchy is better than aristocracy, and aristocracy better than polity—so the contrary will be true of an unjust government, namely, that the ruling power will be more harmful in proportion as it is more unitary. Consequently, tyranny is more harmful than oligarchy; and oligarchy more harmful than democracy.
Moreover, a government becomes unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no heed to the common good, seeks his own private good. Wherefore the further he departs from the common good the more unjust will his government be. But there is a greater departure from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the advantage of many is sought; and there is a still greater departure from the common good in a tyranny, where the advantage of only one man is sought. For a large number is closer to the totality than a small number, and a small number than only one. Thus, the government of a tyrant is the most unjust.
In all things, good ensues from one perfect cause, i.e. from the totality of the conditions favourable to the production of the effect, while evil results from any one partial defect. There is beauty in a body when all its members are fittingly disposed; ugliness, on the other hand, arises when any one member is not fittingly disposed. Thus ugliness results in different ways from many causes; beauty in one way from one perfect cause. … It is expedient therefore that a just government be that of one man only in order that it may be stronger; however, if the government should turn away from justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be weaker and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny.
Deposing a Tyrant
To proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken, not through the private presumption of a few, but rather by public authority.
If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set up in their place a lesser power, namely, the consular power.
If, on the other hand, it pertains to the right of a higher authority to provide a king for a certain multitude, a remedy against the wickedness of a tyrant is to be looked for from him. Thus when Archelaus, who had already begun to reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his father, was imitating his father’s wickedness, a complaint against him having been laid before Caesar Augustus by the Jews, his power was at first diminished by depriving him of his title of king and by dividing one-half of his kingdom between his two brothers. Later, since he was not restrained from tyranny even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in Gaul.
How Climate Affects Politics
A temperate climate is of no little value for political life. As Aristotle says in his Politics [VII, 7: 1327b 23-32]: “Peoples that dwell in cold countries are full of spirit but have little intelligence and little skill. Consequently they maintain their liberty better but have no political life and (through lack of prudence) show no capacity for governing others. Those who live in hot regions are keen-witted and skilful in the things of the mind but possess little spirit, and so are in continuous subjection and servitude. But those who live between these extremes of climate are both spirited and intelligent; hence they are continuously free, their political life is very much developed, and they are capable of ruling others.” Therefore, a temperate region should be chosen for the foundation of a city or a kingdom.
Trade and the Civic Life
A city which must engage in much trade in order to supply its needs also has to put up with the continuous presence of foreigners. But intercourse with foreigners, according to Aristotle’s Politics [V, 3: 1303a 27; VII, 6: 1327a 13-15], is particularly harmful to civic customs. For it is inevitable that strangers, brought up under other laws and customs, will in many cases act as the citizens are not wont to act and thus, since the citizens are drawn by their example to act likewise, their own civic life is upset.
Again, if the citizens themselves devote their life to matters of trade, the way will be opened to many vices. Since the foremost tendency of tradesmen is to make money, greed is awakened in the hearts of the citizens through the pursuit of trade. The result is that everything in the city will become venal; good faith will be destroyed and the way opened to all kinds of trickery; each one will work only for his own profit, despising the public good; the cultivation of virtue will fail since honour, virtue’s reward, will be bestowed upon the rich. Thus, in such a city, civic life will necessarily be corrupted.
The pursuit of trade is also very unfavourable to military activity. Tradesmen, not being used to the open air and not doing any hard work but enjoying all pleasures, grow soft in spirit and their bodies are weakened and rendered unsuited to military labours. In accordance with this view, Civil Law forbids soldiers to engage in business.
Finally, that city enjoys a greater measure of peace whose people are more sparsely assembled together and dwell in smaller proportion within the walls of the town, for when men are crowded together it is an occasion for quarrels and all the elements for seditious plots are provided. Hence, according to Aristotle’s doctrine, it is more profitable to have the people engaged outside the cities than for them to dwell constantly within the walls. But if a city is dependent on trade, it is o prime importance that the citizens stay with the town and there engage in trade.
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I would answer Aquinas with Aristotle, which I should not have to do since he himself knew The Philosopher so well. Perhaps he didn’t have access to “On Statecraft,” though I think he did. Aristotle lays out two principles which I have been thinking about a lot recently. First, Aristotle sees the primary division between “good” and “bad” government in the rule of law. A government may have one person at the head, or a group, or all the people, and in any case it may be good and be a well-functioning society that supports the happiness of the people, or a dysfunctional and miserable group not deserving of the name “community” at all. A monarch may be a king who rules according to precedent and tradition, relying on the established court of advisors and respecting each one’s due, understanding his position and legitimacy to rest with the throne rather than himself; or he can be a tyrant who rules by his own will regardless of tradition or settled law. A group can be an aristocracy that follows the traditional laws, or an oligarchy that rules for the profit of its members. Rule by the people can follow written laws and unwritten traditions and thus be what he calls a “polity,” or it can be a “democracy” that panders to the whims of the mob. If there is rule of law, any political structure can work; if it rests on the shifting whims of those in power, any political structure will be corrupt. Aquinas may have this idea in mind when he discusses the government that rules for the welfare of the people, but “rule of law” is not exactly identical to “welfare of the people;” I think Aristotle wants to emphasize stability and a check on the government’s impulses to act shortsightedly for some imagined benefit.
The second point from Aristotle, which I think Aquinas must be missing (I haven’t read him yet and am relying on your summary) is that, practically speaking, democracy tends to be both wiser and more unified as a society gets larger. Aristotle’s terminology is not consistent, which is maddening; sometimes he writes as if there are six forms of government (as above, three good and three bad); sometimes as if there are three (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy); and sometimes as if there are just two (oligarchy and democracy). Oligarchy in this view is rule by the rich and thus by the few, since the rich are always fewer; democracy is rule by the many and thus by the poor. These two, rich and poor, are in every society and are often the major sources of faction and dissension. Even in an established democracy, there will be a group of rich would-be oligarchs who wish to curb the power of “the mob” so that they, “the best” can rule. A stable democracy will be one where these competing interests of rich and poor are balanced and where there is a sizeable group of people who we would call “middle class,” rich enough to side with the oligarchs when the mob gets too oppressive by large enough to support rule by the many when the oligarchic party tries to impose too much control by the few.
An oligarchic (or even a monarchic) society has this rich-versus-poor/few-versus-many dynamic, but has a second source of factionalism as well: the ambitions of the few create divisions within the ruling class itself. Kings are usually deposed not by peasant rebellions but by other claimants to the throne; Communist Party Chairmen are usually deposed by other would-be Dear Leaders and their supporters, and so on. Thus a democracy only has one source of faction and one sort of factionalism to deal with, while an undemocratic government must deal with controlling the many while also fighting off rivals within its own ruling body. For these reasons, Aristotle thought that as a society became larger, it would tend towards democracy or at least some sort of power-sharing between the rich and the many.
Aristotle also considers the Platonic ideal of the philosopher-king, and allows that if it were possible it would be great; but he doesn’t think it is really practical. Instead, he thinks having a larger group of people working to solve society’s problems could be almost as good. If enough average people discuss a problem long enough, he thinks, they’re likely to hit upon the right solution; the smaller the group, the easier it is for them to lock into the wrong answer. An monarchy can make decisions really fast and implement them, but is also much more able to make a really terrible decision and force it into practice without regard to the consequences to others. So again, in a larger society, a more democratic government can not only prove more stable, it can prove to be wiser in its collective decisions even if the individual citizens are no better than most people anywhere. The idea of the “benign despot” misses that point.
Of course, if Aquinas had argued that a group was better than an individual, someone might have asked why the Church was ruled by a Pope instead of having a more democratic structure like the synagogues. Maybe his ecclesial preference for a single Vicar of Christ led him to overlook the possibility that in human politics more really might be better.
You wrote, “Aquinas may have this idea in mind when he discusses the government that rules for the welfare of the people, but “rule of law” is not exactly identical to “welfare of the people;” I think Aristotle wants to emphasize stability and a check on the government’s impulses to act shortsightedly for some imagined benefit.”
I would agree that “rule of law” is not the same as “welfare of the people”. Laws are made by lawgiver(s), whether the number of them be one, few or many, and reflect the lawgivers will and reason. These laws may be for or against the welfare of the people. The “rule of law” in and of itself doesn’t lead to stability, if the laws themselves are detrimental to the body politic. I think this is why Aquinas emphasizes that the ruling body should always have “advantage” (or “welfare”) of the people in mind.
Regarding democracy, Aquinas essentially puts forth the principle of checks and balances as one of the, if not the, main advantages of democracy. I think you would agree. However, for the same reason, it refutes your argument that democracy “only has one source of faction”.
As for “philosopher-king”, the Platonic premise is the existence of individuals with much greater wisdom (and therefore true power) than the rest. So Aristotle is also correct that democracy is to be preferred, where no such individuals exist, and every one is more or less equal in that regard. Aquinas could argue that the Pope is endowed by God with greater wisdom and power than his brethren for the service of the Church, and that there are Biblical precedents for such rule.
Aristotle assumes the laws are old. They have been tested over time, and are the constitutive principles of the state. And the state is one of the ways the people work towards their happiness. That would give a certain stability even if the laws themselves were not good, though I think he assumes the problems with the laws would get worked out over time since a society that leads towards unhappiness is not fulfilling its function. But he really abhors political instability, so I think he’d prefer unjust laws and incremental change rather than rapid, revolutionary change even if it was for the better. But as I said, he’s not consistent so I might need to reread that or consult a real scholar.
I do deny that “checks and balances” are a “source of faction.” The checks and balances, whether the three branches of US government or the Spartan Ephors, are institutions within the state. They are part of it, A faction as Aristotle is discussing is a group trying to take over the government. The Supreme Court is not a faction, nor is Congress or the Presidency, provided each follows the written and unwritten laws that sustain their work and give them legitimacy. A political party is a sort of faction but, if its members follow the laws and work to preserve the state then there is no harm. It is when a group works to seize power for itself through covert coup, open revolt or something of that sort that it becomes dangerous. Democracy actually incorporates the competition between various interests into its governing principle; the unity of the state emerges through the debates and compromises and bargains people make. The forces that would lead to revolution, Aristotle is saying, are the ongoing conflict between the few rich and the many poor, and the temptation of each group to attempt to exploit the other.
Your point about the Pope is well taken.
You wrote, “Aristotle assumes the laws are old”
Aristotle is a master at presenting arguments from all different perspectives. So I suspect even “real scholars” would disagree on what Aristotle assumes or believes. But, if you can give chapter and verse, we’ll have something concrete to discuss. I’ve read his “Politics” (not sure about “On Statecraft”). If memory serves, Aristotle does say that the laws conducive to stability of the states are different depending on the forms of government, what preserves a democracy might not preserve monarchy, and vice versa, for example.
You wrote, “I do deny that “checks and balances” are a “source of faction.”
My point is that struggles between different groups is what keeps the balance of power in the government. As such, groups within the government have the potential to become factions and take over the government. They also have the potential to remain legitimate, provided they follow the laws. However, the temptation of of power (i.e. the lust of dominion in Augustinian terms) is always present in everyone of us, the leaders are no exception. A case in point would be the Supreme Court taking over the power of the Legislature, something which the late Justice Scalia strenuously warned and fought against.
You wrote, “Your point about the Pope is well taken.”
Aquinas is making an argument for theocracy (with the Pope as the head of the state). I can’t say I agree with him, though I understand his arguments. It is for the same reasons I disagree with Lock’s version of separation of church and state.